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MRS. FROTHINGHAM AND FEDERAL AID
TO CHURCH SCHOOLS
SAM J ERVIN, JR.*
Some years ago the Maryland State Legislature author-
ized matching grants to the private colleges of the State,
including institutions controlled by or connected with religious
denominations. In 1963, the Horace Mann League brought
suit against the Board of Public Works which administered
the program, challenging grants to four of the colleges under
the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amend-
ment.
From the first day the suit was brought, it was heralded
as the one which would lay to rest forever the century-long
controversy as to what aid to church schools is permissible
under the Constitution. During its pendency in the courts,
massive federal aid to elementary, secondary, and higher
church-related education, was begun and expanded. In antici-
pation of a definitive opinion by the U S. Supreme Couurt,
efforts in Congress to allow judicial review of the legislation
were defeated.
The suit has now run its course, leaving in its wake
more constitutional confusion than ever Rather than a har-
binger of solution to a constitutional crisis and emotional
controversy, it turned out to be fuel for the fire it was meant
to quench.
Nevertheless, the Horace Mass case has served a purpose
-it has made this symposium especially timely More im-
portantly, it has clearly pointed up the immediate need for
Congressional action to ensure judicial review of Federal
aid to church schools.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AID
Judicial Review is to the Judiciary what the power of the purse-
strings is to Congress-its base of power, its check on the other two
branches of the federal government essential to maintaining the
Chairman of United States Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights A.B.
1917, Unversity of North Carolina, LL.B. 1922, Harvard University.
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balance among the three. Limited only by self-imposed rules of
judicial restraint and the constitutional requirement of a case or
controversy, the Supreme Court as conservator of the Constitution
employs judicial review as its most important tool.
It has used the tool to protect virtually every clause of the Bill
of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments from countless real
or imagined attacks at every level of government from the county
courthouse to the White House. In these days of an activist court,
it is doubly ironic that the court is apparently impotent to protect
one of our first freedoms-religion. Yet this is exactly the case with
respect to both federal and state aid to church schools-aid which
hints of a law "respecting an establishment of religion." The Su-
preme Court has procedurally so insulated itself in technicalities
that there can be no adjudication of this basic freedom. The
"why" and the "what-to-do" of this dilemma is the subject of this
article.
There are only two "whys" to consider: first, the requirement
of a case or controversy; and, second, the presence of a plaintiff
with the requisite standing to sue. And if the first constitutional
"why" is not satisfied, there is no need to bother with a discussion
of the second, a procedural barrier, or to consider a "what-to-do."
It is clear, however, that valid cases concerning aid to paro-
chial education can arise and that one gigantic controversy already
exists. This is between the federal government and citizen-taxpayers
interested in enforcement of the provisions relating to religion in
the First Amendment.
1
EXTENT OF FEDERAL Am TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Concern for the principle of separation of church and state is
not simply a matter of academic exercise and reflection on the
evils of an established church. Although the First Amendment pro-
scribes public aid to any and all religious orders,2 today there
are over 100 federal programs allocating billions of dollars for sec-
ular functions at institutions and agencies which operate primarily
to proselytize a particular religion. This outside assistance affects
the operating budgets of these institutions to a degree that many
have charged violations of the establishment clause of the First
Amendment.
The bulk of these programs are administered by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare; and it is in this use to
which public funds are put that the danger of establishment lies.
The Department operates thirty-five major education programs on
1. And there is currently no dearth of plaintiffs. At this writting 31 cases were
pending In various parts of the county challenging public aid to church schools.
2. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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a fulltime basis. All these programs, extending from pre-school
to the graduate level, incorporate church schools into the federal
education scheme.3 Obligations of HEW for fiscal year 1965 to
educational institutions, other than administrative agencies, included
2,935 to public institutions and 3,268 to private institutions.
4 Of
the latter, 1,979 were church affiliated.
5
The Department itself has a difficult time keeping up with all
its beneficiaries and is naturally cautious about identifying the 134
with "undetermined" affiliation with religious bodies. 6 It refers
to these as " 'de facto' " church affiliated institutions.7
In addition to the numerous categories of direct education
assistance, HEW manages 24 programs in the Public Health Serv-
ice including research grants, construction of health and teaching
facilities and libraries, fellowships, and student loans, which are
available to all non-profit private institutions. For example, currently
there are 1051 health research projects in which the Federal govern-
ment shares the cost; 548 of these are privately owned-465 by sec-
ular institutions, 50 Catholic, 28 Protestant and 5 Jewish.8
Programs under the Economic Opportunity Act more closely
approximate an establishment of religion in their immediate and
practical effect than do those of HEW The 1966 status report of
OEO contains a list of operative programs in the United States
which is over one thousand pages long.9 Of these programs, six
percent are conducted by a church or church-related institution.10
Consequently, of the $1.5 billion in OEO appropriations for fiscal year
1966, $90,000,000 go to church-related institutions."
In an action to contest the constitutionality of the legislation
authorizing the programs described above, an interpretation of the
establishment clause is indispensable. Consequently, a case or con-
troversy within the meaning of article III of the Constitution neces-
sarily exists. This brings us to the second "why," the standing of
3. HEW Programs Under Which Religious Groups, Organizations, and Institutions
May Recive Assistance, Table 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as HEW Programs].
4. Id. Table IL
5. Ibid.
6. HEW Programs, Table III.
7. Letter from Assistant General Counsel, Dept. of HEW to Chief Counsel of the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, May 3, 1966.
8. HEW Programs, Table VI.
A related area of responsibility for the Department of HEW is vocational rehabilita-
tion. The Vocational rehabilitation Administration operates 13 programs in the fields of
research, training, information services, construction grants, and workshop assistance. The
Administration on Aging maintains three programs affording grants to public and private
non-profit institutions for research. It also extends consultative services and technical
assistance to these institutions.
In the area of wefare administration, there are eleven programs which benefit
directly or indirectly religious institutions. Primarily these relate to child health care.
Juvenile delinquency and cooperative research.
9. OEO Poverty Program Information, June 80, 1966.
10. Hearings on Senate Bill 2097 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judioiari, 89th Cong., 2d Bess. 141 '(1966) [hereinafter cited
as 1966 Hearings].
11. OEO Poverty Program Information, supra note 9.
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a litigant in this hypothetical situation. There is a neutral tendency
to look upon standing as a part of a case or controversy However,
the two concepts are separate and distinct. Standing should be more
associated with capacity Although Congress can confer appellate
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, it is prohibited by article III from
"creating" a case or controversy Accordingly, Congress can con-
fer standing and set requirements for capacity to sue so long as the
litigant supplies his own case.
12
There is little difficulty in finding a plaintiff with the requisite
standing to sue in state courts. Presently, there are approximately
twenty-nine cases pending in state courts involving church-state
issues. Twenty-five of these cases concern the establishment clause
of the first amendment, and of these 14 involve public aid to sec-
tarian schools. The remaining cases question religious practices in
public facilities, tax exemption for religious bodies, disposal of fed-
eral surplus property and other possible first amendment violations.' s
However, a plaintiff wishing to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute in federal courts is faced with a procedural barrier which
emanates from the old case of Frothingham v Mellon. " At issue
was Mrs. Frothingham's attack, as a taxpayer, on the validity of
federal disbursements to states under the Maternity Act. 15  The
Maternity Act authorized appropriations to be apportioned among
those states accepting and complying with its provisions, for the
purpose of reducing maternal and infant mortality and protecting
the health of mothers and infants. Mrs. Frothingham's contention
was that the Maternity Act violated the tenth amendment. The
Supreme Court found that the increase of an individual's tax burden
attributable to the Maternity Act was indistinguishable from the in-
crease sustained by every other taxpayer Applying existing pro-
cedures applicable to suits in equity in federal courts, the Supreme
Court held that Mrs. Frothingham did not show that she had sus-
tained or was immediately in danger of sustaining some direct and
irreparable injury entitling her to preventive relief.'6 As an in-
dividual taxpayer then, the plaintiff lacked procedural standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Maternity Act. Beyond this
12. Cited as lending superficial support for the proposition that Congress may not
grant standing to sue is Muskrat v. United States, 019 U.S. 346 (1911). There, Congress
had conferred on certain designated Cherokee Indians an express right to institute suits
in the Court of Claims to test the validity of statutes imposing restrictions on Indian land
grants. The Supreme Court found that there was no adverse interest between the litigants
and that "the sole purpose of the law is to determine the constitutional validity of this
class legislation in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property right
necessarily involved in the decision in question and concerning which the only Judg-
ment required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation in question." at 361-62.
The Court was simply asked to render an advisory opinion which it could not do.
13. See discussion of leading federal case on page 691.
14. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Frothingham].
15. Act of November 23, 1921, c. 135, 42 STAT. 224.
16. Frothingham, supra note 14, at 488. Had the plaintiff been armed with a legisla-
tive grant of authority permitting her to challenge the Maternity Act, the result In this
case would likely have been quits different
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holding, the remainder of the Court's opinion constitutes dicta; and
it is this dicta which has raised the specter of a constitutional defect
in taxpayers' suits.
If a constitutional test is to be had of recent federal education
legislation providing funds to sectarian institutions, the most im-
portant question is whether the Court has construed the standing
doctrine of Frothingham as a constitutional principle of article III,
section 2, or merely a decisional application of federal rules of civil
procedure. The fact is, both before and after Frothingham, the
Court has consented to pass on the merits of constitutional issues
presented by appellants whose standing to originate acts would not
satisfy the strictures of Frothingham." This cannot be explained
except to say that standing is a sometimes thing; and a rejection of
a suit because of a standing deficiency is an act of judicial discretion.
Moreover, Frothingham was decided during a period when there were
frequent attacts on welfare legislation. The Court reviewed some of
these Acts and invalidated them but it also relied on its own restraint
in refusing others.
THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFFS'
STANDING TO SUE IN ESTABLISHMENT CASES
Standing to sue is inseparable from the protectable interest one
asserts in seeking redress of grievances in a court of law With the
exception of the rights insured by the 14th Amendment, the Supreme
Court has said more since 1947 about standing and the protectable
interests guaranteed by the first amendment than any other con-
stitutional right. Although these cases arose from state courts, they
illustrate an attitude toward standing which is applicable to disputes
in federal courts. It is this attitude and the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of plaintiffs' standing which is necessary to a consideration of
"what-to-do" about the technicalities precluding an adjudication of
a basic freedom.
Everson v Board of Educatton18 and McCollum v Board of
Education1 are the leading cases on the nature and scope of estab-
lishment. The vitality of both cases, however, lies in the dicta of the
Court and the concurring opinions. 20
In Everson, a local school board authorized reimbursement to
17. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) [hereinafter cited as Bradfield] Cochran
V. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
18. Everson, supra note 2.
19. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) [hereinafter cited as McCollum].
20. The eloquent dictum in Everson concerning the establishment clause has been re-
peated in almost every case since involving that provision of the Constitution "It (the
First Amendment) was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity. It was
intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religious' hands
off the state and, above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public life by
denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy or the
public purse." Supra note 2, at 26.
695
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parents of money spent by them for transportation of their children
to public and parochial schools pursuant to a New Jersey statute.
Plaintiff, a taxpayer in this school district, filed suit in the New Jer-
sey Court challenging the right of the school board to reimburse
parents of parochial school students. His contention was that the
statute and the resolution of the school board violated both the state
and federal constitutions. A divided Supreme Court upheld the de-
cision of the New Jersey Court of Appeals which found no consti-
tutional violations. No reference was made to the standing of the
plaintiff by the majority of dissenting opinions. It was simply assumed,
although the plaintiff sued only in his capacity as a district taxpayer
asserting violations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the First AmendmenL
Shortly thereafter, in McCollum, the added interest of a parent
was at issue. Under the general supervisory powers given school
boards by the Illinois State legislature over the use of the public
school buildings within the school districts, the Champaign Board
of Education instituted a "released time" program of religious in-
struction. Plaintiff, as resident and taxpayer of Champaign County
and parent of a child enrolled in the public schools of that county,
brought suit for mandamus to declare the released time program in
violation of the First and Fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's con-
tention, and the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiff lacked standing was held to be without merit.21 The opin-
ion of the Court made no other reference to the issue of standing.
The lone dissenter, Mr Justice Reed, also ignored the problem of
standing.
Mr Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, stated that "where
a complainant is deprived of property by being taxed for unconstitu-
tional purposes, such as directly or indirectly to support a religious
establishment, the Supreme Court can protect a taxpayer against
such a levy ",22 At the same time, however, Mr Justice Jackson also
thought it doubtful that the taxpayer in this case showed any sub-
stantial property injury 21
Four years later, in Doremus v Board of Education,24 the Court
looked more closely at the plaintiffs' allegations and found none wor-
thy of consideration. There, the issue, initiated by a parent of a
school age child and an individual taxpayer, concerned the constitu-
tionality of a New Jersey statute providing for the reading of the Old
Testament at the opening of each school day 25
21. McCollum, aupra noto 19, at 206.
22. Id. at 233.
23. Id. at 234.
24. 342 tT.S. 429 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Doremus].
25. N. J. REv. STAT., 1 14-77 (1937).
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AID
The plaintiffs claimed the statute violated the establishment
clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. They
failed to charge, however, that the brief interruption in the school day
added to the cost of the educational system of New Jersey Such an
allegation might have given rise to a due process question litigable in
the eyes of the Court.26 Moreover, the Court found no averment
that Bible reading increased their taxes nor that they would be out-
of-pocket because of it nor that Bible reading offended their religious
sensibilities. Consequently, the Court dismissed the taxpayer's appeal
for want of jurisdiction. The parent's suit was dismissed as moot
since the child had graduated from school.
In Doremus, the Court said there was a financial interest in
Everson sufficient to maintain an action. The interest there was not
dissimilar from that in Doremus had it been averred. The Court also
said that unless the taxpayer's suit was a good-faith pocketbook ac-
tion and not a feigned issue of taxation, there is no case or controversy
within the meaning of Article III, Sec. 2.27
Whether the plaintiffs' injury in Doremus was quantitatively suf-
ficient to maintain the action was not really taken into account since
a discontinuance of the Bible reading could not be shown to produce a
decrease in taxes. It is not clear, then, whether the Court refused
the standing argument purely on the basis of the de mznimus rule or
because it found no measurable disbursement actually earmarked
for a purpose offensive to the Constitution. For example, in Everson
there was a specific statutory provision for the transportation of
school children.
The New Jersey Supreme Court was silent on the question of
standing as it ruled against plaintiffs on the merits. The United
States Supreme Court's reference to the case or controversy stan-
dard is sufficiently vague to leave open the possibility of correcting
the defect in standing. Justices Douglas, Reed and Burton, dissent-
ing, found no defect. Moreover, they argued that so long as the
state courts entertained the issue, the Supreme Court should also re-
view it. While agreeing .with the majority that a taxpayer could not
maintain a suit to enjoin a federal law, they nevertheless felt that
nothing in the Constitution prevented a state from giving taxpayers
standing to sue.28 Neither the majority nor the minority opinions in
that case mentioned Cochran v Board of Education29 or Heim v
McCall,0 in which the Court had accepted jurisdiction, apparently on
the ground that the question of standing had been resolved by the
state courts.
26. Everson, supra note 2.
27. Doremus, aupra note 24, at 435.
28. Id. at 435-6.
29. 281 U.S. 370 (1980).
80. 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
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During the same term in which Doremus was heard, the Court
was called on to review the constitutionality of a "release time" pro-
gram similar to that in McCollum-Zorach v Clauson.3' There, the
plaintiffs, taxpayers and residents of New York City and parents of
children attending its public schools, challenged a "released time"
program permitting children to leave the school grounds and go to
religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises dur-
ing the school day But unlike McCollum, where the classrooms were
turned over to religious instructors, the costs of the New York pro-
gram was paid for by the religious organizations. The Supreme Court,
therefore, rejected plaintiffs' interest based on establishment since
no financial interest was involved. It also rejected a claim based on
free exercise, finding no coercion inherent in the program. It then,
in the now famous Douglas footnote,3 2 recognized standing in the
plaintiffs simply by saying "appellants here are parents of children
currently attending schools subject to the released time programs."
33
Before preparing the decisions in McCollum and Zorach, the
Court had evidently decided that the released time was offensive in
Illinois, but permissible in New York. Furthermore, it is apparent
that in McCollum the Court wanted to establish a precedent recog-
nizing a parent's interest in the activities of the school which his
child attends. It was unable to support this precedent in Doremus
and should not have attempted to do so in Zorach after judicially
rejecting every possible ground on which the plaintiff could stand.
In 1961, 1962, and 1963, the Supreme Court made an effort to re-
solve the confusion surrounding our understanding of the First
Amendment's proscriptions regarding an establishment of religion
as well as of the related law of standing.
Although the first case, McGowan v Maryland,3 4 adds little to the
case law on the First Amendment, it reveals that the Court was not
insensitive to the havoc it had created in Doremus, McCollum and
Zorach. In this case, seven employees of a large department store
had been indicted for violating the Sunday closing laws of the State
of Maryland. They contested the constitutional validity of these
criminal statutes. Among the questions for consideration was whether
appellants had standing to contend that the statutes violated the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Since
appellants did not allege any infringement of their own religious
freedoms, the Court applied the general rule that "a litigant may
only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities"3 5 and held
that they had no standing to raise the free exercise question. How-
31. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Zorach].
32. Id. at 308, n. 4.
33. Ibid.
34. 366 U.S. 420 (19 ).
35. Id. at 429.
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ever, appellants did assert a direct economic injury due to the im-
position on them of the tenets of the Christian religion by the Sunday
closing laws. The Court thus held they had standing to complain that
the statutes are laws respecting an establishment of religion. On
the merits, the Court found the laws constitutionally permissible be-
ing more secular than religious in character. 36
The following year, the Court handed down the first of the Prayer
Decisions, Engel v Vitale.3 7 Here, it not only confirmed the interest
a parent has in his child's school day activities, it also extended its
philosophy concerning establishment. In Engel, the parents of ten
pupils in New Hyde Park, New York, challenged the constitutionality
of the New York Board of Regents prayer as violative of the estab-
lishment clause of the First Amendment. Ruling the prayer exercises
unconstitutional, Justice Black said for the Court: "The Establish-
ment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by
the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or
not." 38 Although the specific question of standing was not men-
tioned in the majority opinion, this statement by the Court indicates
a unique example of flexibility and liberality m the court's attitude
toward standing requirements in establishment cases.3 9  Justice
Douglas, m a concurring opinion, however, added a caveat to this.
He said, citing Frothingham, "the fact that taxpayers do not have
standing in the Federal courts to raise the issue is, of course, no
justification for drawing a line between what is done m New York
on one hand and on the other what we do and what Congress does m
this matter of prayer o40
The latest decisions in this area are Abington School District v.
Schempp and Murray v Curlett,41 treated jointly by the Court. Since
36. Id. at 444.
37. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Engel].
38. Id. at 430.
39. The decision in Engel, an unpopular one with the public at large, also encouraged
comment from the academic community. A few scholars felt the result was desirable
while others felt the opinion expanded the judicial function more than usual. The following
appraisals are typical. "The result is perhaps desirable for it permits a very limited class
to exert the powers of a watchdog to keep the schools, the most vulnerable area, free
from the imposition of religious indoctrination. It is hard to see, however, 'why the par-
ents are a better group to exercise this power of surveillance than other citizens. Their
interest in school activities is greater But so, too, is vulnerability to the pressures of the
conimunity in which they and their children live. Perhaps the Court is starting down the
road toward ustification of the 'public action' that Professor Jaffe has advocated
If so, however, that goal is more likely to be reached if the Court would attempt to
achieve it by fuller explanation of what it is doing." (Emphasis added) "The Regents'
Prayer Case," The Supreme Court Review- 1962, p. 22. Of like import are the comments
of Professor Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr. "Engel thus suggests that the Supreme Court has
somewhat revised its previous ideas concerning 'standing in court', concerning, that Is, the
type of grievance a litigant must experience before the federal judiciary will intervene
to forbid state governmental activity. The opinions seem to take as premise a judicial
function rather more expanded than most lawyers had come to find usual." Sutherland,
Establishnncit According to Engel. 76 HAav. L. P.v. 25, 27 (1962).
40. Engel, supra note 37, at 441, n. 6.
41. 274 U.S. 203 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Abington or Murray, respectively].
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this is the most recent instance in which the Court has rendered an
opinion concerning the separation of church and state, its recognition
of standing must also be viewed as the last word in that area.
In Abmnton, the Schempp family, parents and children, con-
tested the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute requiring the
reading of the Bible in the public schools. The three-judge court in-
itially held the statute unconstitutional under both the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 42 After granting
plaintiffs' motion to amend the pleadings,'4 3 the trial court rendered
its judgment based only on the Establishment Clause.
4 '
In Murray, plaintiffs, parent and child, complained of the prac-
tice in the Baltimore City school of Bible reading and prayer con-
ducted pursuant to Article 77, section 202 of the Annotated Code of
Maryland. Plaintiffs asserted that the rule permitting such practice
was in violation of their rights "to freedom of religion under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments" and in violation of the "principle of
separation of church and state, contained therein."' 5 More specifi-
cally, their rights were allegedly infringed because the practice
"subjected their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority ",48
The complaint did not specifically rely on either the Establishment
Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. The Maryland Court of Appeals
held the exercises not in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the prac-
tices complained of in both cases violated the Establishment Clause.
7
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Clark, and the separate
concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Brennan are replete with
discourses on the meaning of establishment.
In these two cases, and in the preceding four or five cases in-
volving church-state separation, the Court recognized that a parent's
interest in his child's welfare, when placed in the context of a First
Amendment infringement, was substantial enough to compel the
Court's attention. It chose on this occasion to find the standing of a
party in an establishment case where before it had scarcely looked.
Justice Clark, for the Court, pointed out that "The requirements
for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause,
unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof
that particular religious freedoms are infringed." 48 He distinguished
Doremus, which was dismissed as moot and because one appellant
failed to establish standing as a taxpayer Both cases involved the
42. 177 F.Supp. 298 (1959). The statute had been amended during litigation.
43. 201 F.Supp. 815 (1962).
44. Abington, supra note 41, at 205.
45. Murray supra note 41, at 212.
46. Ibid.
47. Abington and Murray, supra note 41, at 205.
48. Id. at 224, n. 9.
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same substantive issues; 49 but, in Abington and Murray, the Court
ruled the plaintiffs were directly affected as school children and par-
ents. This confirmed a concept of standing to sue in establishment
cases based on ethos rather than financial interest. However, the
independent taxpayer's capacity to sue was placed extremely in
doubt.5 0
The free exercise claims in McCollum and Zorach had permitted
a successful showing of standing. And, to resolve the cases, Justice
Brennan attempted to answer the conceptual difficulty inherent in a
pure establishment case where no pecuniary loss is asserted. In
his appraisal, a parent is the most directly and immediately con-
cerned by the establishments challenged in the present case. If the
parents were denied opportunity for judicial review, serious infringe-
ments of the First Amendment may go unchecked. 51 These cases
reveal little uniformity in the standards applied by the Court for de-
termining the justiciablity of the establishment cases. However,
the interests maintained in these cases were at least sufficient to
constitute a case or controversy within the meaning of the jurisdic-
tional powers of the Supreme Court. If the Court ever felt constrained
by the Frothingham principle, it did not refrain from appraising the
merits of the constitutional issues embraced within these appeals
from state courts. Moreover, the problems in state courts are no
easier than the standing problems of the federal courts. Practically
speaking, a taxpayer's interest in the Federal Treasury is as sub-
stantial as his interest in a State Treasury
One simple proposition is preeminent--one who, in fact, is
affected adversely by governmental action should have standing to
challenge that action. Moreover, the attitude of the Supreme Court
toward standing in the recent establishment cases seems so appreci-
ably expanded that a favorable judicial reaction to legislation per-
mitting federal taxpayers to sue is expected.
PROPOSED ACT TO ENFORCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The state of the law as revealed in these state cases and the
political policy of the current administration toward separation in-
dicates quite clearly that a legislative approach to the problem of
standing to sue is necessaary and desirable. Remedial legislation has
been attempted on at least three occasions during the last two Con-
gresses. In 1963, Senator John Sherman Cooper and I co-sponsored
an amendment to the proposed Higher Education Facilities Act
which would have permitted judicial review of that legislation.5 2
49. Ibid.
50. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, asserted that the ordinary taxpayer's standing
"may be open to question." Id. at 266, n. 30.
51. Ibid.
52. H.. 6143, Arndt. 216, 88th Cong., 1st Seas. (1963).
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Our amendment was adopted by the Senate" but was later stricken
by the House and Senate Conference Committee.5 4 In 1965 Congress
enacted the Elementary and Secondardy Education Act, 55 the most
far-reaching education law in the history of our nation, authorizing
extensive allocations of federal funds to non-secular schools. During
the Senate debate on this measure Senator Cooper and I again offered
an amendment which would have provided judicial review of that
Act.56 However, the sponsors of the Education Bill feared that his
amendment might jeopardize its final passage. Consequently, the
amendment was rejected. 57 As an alternative, Senator Morse, the
floor manager, offered an independent judicial review bill which be-
came Senate Bill 2097 This bill was the subject of extensive hearings
by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 58 and was
passed by the Senate on July 29, 1966. 59 The House, however, took
no action before Congress adjourned. On January 11, 1967, I intro-
duced Senate Bill 3 which is identical to the measure approved by
the Senate last year 6o This legislation makes no pronouncements
as to the permissible boundaries of aid to church-related schools;
rather, it is designed to allow adjudication of the issue in the proper
forum-the courts. It provides effective machinery for the enforce-
ment of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, by granting legislative standing to federal taxpayers,
citizens and institutional beneficiaries of federal programs to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of nine acts of Congress as being inconsis-
tent with the provisions relating to religion in the First Amendment.
These classes of plaintiffs are given the requisite standing to sue in
litigation which qualifies as a case or controversy within the meaning
of article III of the Constitution of the United States. The bill in no
way defines a case or controversy but merely grants standing to the
parties involved in any case or controversy which may arise under
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment.
Under the bill, loans on grants authorized under the following
Acts may be challenged:
The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963;
Title VII of the Public Health Service Act;
The National Defense Education Act of 1958;
The Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental
Health Centers Construction Act of 1963;
53. 109 CONG. R C. 19499 (1963).
54. H. Co N. REwr. 884, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
55. 20 U.S.C. 241 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ESEA].
56. HR. 2362, Amdt. 70, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
57. 111 CONG. R C. 7611 (1965).
58. Hearfings, 1966.
59. 112 CoNo. REc. (daily ed.) 16893 (1966).
60. 113 CONG REC. (daily ed.) S35 (1967). This measure was also sponsored by Sena-
tors Morse, Cooper. Clark, Yarborough, Smathers. Holland and. Fong.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AID
Title II of the act of September 30, 1950 - Public Law 874,
81st., Cong.,
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965;
The Cooperative Research Act;
The Higher Education Act of 1965; and
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
The enumeration of these acts in Section I is not intended to be ex-
clusive although review is expressly limited to those acts. The report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 2097 describes these
Acts as follows: "They are representative of legislation which affords
substantial and direct financial aid to denominationally controlled
and denominationally related institutions.' '61
The legislative history of the Acts enumerated in Section I of
Senate Bill 3 clearly reveals that the constitutionality of these Acts
was in question when they were being deliberated in Congress. Sena-
tor Wayne Morse, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Educa-
tion and responsible for much of the legislation which could be
brought under review by this bill, said when he asked for this
legislation:
I am asking for this through the back door because I
cannot walk through the front door for a general Federal Aid
to Education bill because I feel existing court decisions bar
my entrance there.
So what do we do? We used what amounts to a
subterfuge approach on this constitutional question. We had
no other choice. We used the national defense education
approach, we used the contract approach, we used the
categorical approach.
62
Hearings conducted on Senate Bill 2097 revealed that any dis-
cussion between limited and general aid to religious institutions would
be specious. In its report, the Senate Judiciary Committee submitted:
Likewise to achieve direct aid, which is undoubtedly
unconstitutional, by categorizing the funds or justifying such
allocations in the interest of national defense or public wel-
fare may also be fallacious.
A representative for the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare testified before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
that judicial review was unnecessary since the Executive and the
Legislative Branches of the government had decided that the acts are
constitutional. 3 The Judiciary Committee disagreed, however, and
61. 8. Rept. No. 1403, 89th Cong., 2d Ses. 4 (1966).
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 8.
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found that Congress had carefully deliberated upon the constitution-
ality of the Acts covered by the bill but that the controversy had not
been resolved.8 '
ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 3
Section 1 of Senate Bill 3 provides that publication of the order
of the federal officer approving or disapproving a grant or loan
under any one of the enumerated acts is a condition precedent to
the effectuation of the order and constitutes official notice to a
party wishing to challenge the order as unconstitutional. The basis
for all challenges is limited to the provisions relating to religion
in the First Amendment to the Constitution. Moreover, after the
order is published there is a ninety-day limitation on the bringing
of an action.
Section 2 of Senate Bill 3 permits any public or other nonprofit
agency or institution which is or may be prejudiced by the order
of the federal officer making a loan or grant to bring an action
for declaratory judgment to determine whether the order is con-
sistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Section 3 authorized corporate and individual federal taxpayers
to bring a similar action. The plaintiff need only show he has paid
income tax during the preceding year Identical relief is afforded
all citizens to sue to vindicate the public's interest in the observance
of the First Amendment.
Section 4 authorizes any public or other nonprofit institution
or agency to bring a civil action to review the final decision of
a federal officer which denies a loan or grant applied for under any
act enumerated in Section 1. The denial must have been on the
ground that such grant oe loan would be inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Consistent administration of programs throughout the country is
insured by the requirement in Section 5 that all actions be brought
in the District Court of the United States for the District of Co-
lumbia. This is also a logical jurisdiction since the defendant in all
three types of actions provided by Senate Bill 3 includes the federal
officer issuing the order which is to be challenged, and, with the
exception of Section 2 actions, the federal officer is the only defend-
ant. In the event two or more actions are brought which challenge
the same grant or loan, the court may consolidate them for the
purpose of trial and judgment. The provisions in this section which
64. Ibid. Some of us who are sponsors of this bill feel there are serious doubts as to
the constitutionality of irrany recent education and poverty programs. Others are con-
fident that these programs meet the test of the First Amendment But one thing on which
we all agree, the courts must be given the opportunity to decide. Only then will this
century-long controversy end.
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call for expediting review and appeal should guarantee speedy and
orderly processing of cases under the bill.
To avoid interrupting important education and welfare programs
already in operation when Senate Bill 3 goes into effect, none of
these programs could be subjected to attack through the procedures
provided by this measure. Moreover, no grant or loan approved
after enactment of this act may be suspended until a final judgment
by the court declaring the particular grant or loan unconstitutional.
The court may, in its discretion, grant an interlocutory injunction
enjoining the payment of a grant or loan which is claimed to be
invalid. Upon a final determination of unconstitutionality, only the
unexpended portion of a grant must be refunded for re-allotment
to the appropriation from which it was paid.
Congress has the authority and the obligation to provide pro-
cedures by which the unlawful acts of public officials may be con-
trolled. This is presently a purpose of the Administrative Procedure
Act. The actions of the public officials which are challenged as
being unlawful under this bill, however, are those which are un-
lawful only because the legislation authorizing their action may be
unconstitutional. A judgment of the Court reached through the
machinery established in Senate Bill 3 will determine once and for
all whether the federal officer approving a particular grant or loan
under any one of the enumerated acts does or does not have the
constitutional authority to do so.
PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION IN LIGHT OF RECENT AND
PENDING LITIGATION
Probably the most significant case involving the Establishment
Clause in many years was Horace Mann League v Board of Public
Works, 65 the problem of standing illustrates that now more than
ever we must obtain a judicial opinion on the constitutionality of
federal programs. Maryland has been especially productive of re-
ligion cases with national significance because the provisions relat-
ing to religion in the state constitution are weak and generally
thought to contain few prohibitions against aid to religious bodies.6
This weakness has provided an opportunity for judicial decisions
which would clarify the legality of federal programs of assistance
to private education. The Horace Mann case, therefore, was designed
to insure a decision based on the Federal Constitution rather than
the Maryland Constitution. In that case appropriations under four
Maryland statutes providing grants to four private colleges were
65. 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied, appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 97 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Horace Mann].
66. Article 36 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Maryland provides
in part. "Nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or contrbilu,
unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any ministry;
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challenged as being an establishment of religion under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In drawing its conclusions, the Maryland Court of Appeals first
looked at the extent to which the colleges involved had affiliations
with religious orders. In making its determination it used the
following as indicators of sectarianism:
1) the stated purpose of the institution;
2) the religious affiliation of college personnel, including
student enrollment;
3) the college's relationship with religious organizations
such as the degree of financial dependence and control
by its governing body;
4) the place of religion in the college curriculum;
5) the image of the college in the community; and other
miscellaneous aspects.
Applying these standards to Hood College, the court found no
sectarian influence and therefore upheld its right to receive public
assistance. As to Western Maryland College, St. Joseph College and
the College of Notre Dame of Maryland, the court concluded that
they were church-controlled. The court observed that in granting
funds to these three institutions, the state legislature had stepped
out of its role of complete neutrality toward religion. It spoke of
such action as "losing its character as being incidental to lawful
general welfare legislation. '8 7 It also held that the operative effect
of the enactments in question would be to use the state's coercive
power to aid religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 8
A writ of certiorari was denied and an appeal was dismissed
m the Horace Mann case by the United States Supreme Court.8 9
The failure of the Supreme Court to review this case was a dis-
appointment to many interested in both the church-state issue as
well as the procedural question of standing.70 Moreover, it enlarged
the constitutional cloud which hangs over federal programs which
provide construction grants to church-related institutions.
It is interesting to note that at least one aspect of the Horace
Mann case was not new to the Supreme Court. In Bradfield v
Roberts,71 the Court handed down its only decision involving a
federal expenditure challenged as violating the Establishment
67. Horace Mann, supra note 65, 220 A.2d at 65 (1965).
68. Ibid.
69. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart were of the opinion that certiorari
should have been granted and the case set for plenary consideration and that the appeal
should have been accepted by the Court.
70. See editorials, High Court Ducks one Issue, New York Times, November 16,
1966 Sectarian Aid in Doubt, Pittsburgh (Pa.) Post-Gazette, November 17, 1966
Rule on Church Schools Needed, Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, November 18, 1966.
71. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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Clause. 72 There Congress had authorized a grant to a hospital
located in the District of Columbia and operated by a Roman
Catholic order Finding no evidence that sectarian influence was
exercised by the religious order in the hospital, the Court ruled
that the institution was nonsectarian. 7 As in the Maryland decision,
the Supreme Court in Bradfield examined the corporate charter of
the institution in question and the extent of control over the mange-
ment of the hospital by the Roman Catholic Church. This procedure
will undoubtedly be a determinative factor in future cases involving
public assistance to private institutions.
The failure of the Supreme Court to review the Horace Mann
case led those advocating strict separation of church and state to
look to other courts for judicial guidelines which would stand as a
precedent for the entire nation. New York was selected by the
American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Congress
as a proving ground for the principle of separation of church and
state and as a site to test the standing requirements of plaintiffs
in establishment cases.
The first effort m New York to contest the constitutionality of
aid to religious schools in the form of textbooks occurred in Board
of EducatLon of Central School District No. 1 v Allen.7' Initiated
prior to the Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal in the Horace
Mann case, the New York textbook case was also important since
it involved programs similar to those being sponsored by the Federal
Government.
75
The Education Law of the State of New York, Section 701, sub-
division 3, requires school districts to purchase textbooks and to
loan them to pupils enrolled in grades 7-11 in all public and private
schools. The plaintiffs m the Allen case, boards of education and
towns in the state of New York, challenged this law as unconsti-
tutional under Article 11, Section 3 of the New York Constitution
and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment to the Constitution."
The defendant, Commissioner of Education of the State of New
York, answered the complaint with an affirmative defense question-
72. In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Court held that the expenditure
there was actually of funds held by the United States in trust for American Indians.
73. Bradfield, supra note 71, at 297.
74. 51 Misc. 2d 297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Allen].
75. For example, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title II, pro-
vides for federal grants to state education agencies for the acquisition of school library
resources, textbooks, and other institutional materials for the use of the pupils and
teachers in public and private elementary and secondary schools.
76. N. Y. CONST., art. XI, § 3 (1938), provides "Neither the state nor any sub-
division thereof shall use its property or credit or any public money, or authorized or
permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for ex-
anination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under
the control or direction of any religious denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but
tho legislature may provide for the transportation of children to and from any school or
iistitution of learning."
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ing the plaintiff's standing to bring the action against the state or
state official, and also his capacity to question the constitutionality
of a state statute.
The lower court held the statute in question violative of the
New York constitutional provision prohibiting the use of state or
any public money either directly or indirectly in aid or maintenance
of any school under the control of a particular religious, denomin-
ation. As for the plaintiff's standing to bring the action, the court
said that the power to strike down a statute as unconstitutional
belongs to the people and that a denial of this power to the people
could, per se, be a violation of a constitutional right.7
On appeal to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court the judgment was reversed. Although a majority of the court
was satisfied that the statute in question did not contravene the
Constitution of the United States or the State of New York, the
case was dismissed upon a finding that the plaintiffs had no stand-
ing or status to bring the action.
78
Prior to the reversal of Allen and immediately after the Horace
Mann case, two other cases were instituted in New York. One,
Polier v Board of Education of the City of New York, 7 was brought
in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Another, Flast
v Gardner,80 was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. In the Polier case, a group of
taxpayers and residents of New York City were challenging the
expenditure of state and federal funds for remedial instruction and
guidance services which are being offered in religiously-affiliated
schools. These programs are conducted pursuant to the provisions
and authorizations of Section 205 (a) (2) of the Federal Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965.81 The plaintiffs contend that
these practices are ultra vires and also violate the United States
Constitution as well as the state constitution. They seek an injunc-
tion barring the defendants from:
1) using public funds and property for instruction and
guidance in sectarian schools,
2) recruiting teachers to engage in such instructions,
3) exerting pressure to obtain such teachers, and
77. Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen, 51 Misc. 2d 297,
300, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (1966).
78. Allen, supra note 74.
79. Plaintiff's Complaint, Index No. 19540, 1966 [hereinafter cited as Polier].
80. Plaintiff's Complaint, Civil Action No. 4102 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Flast].
Si. 20 U.S.C. 241 e (a) (2) (1965) provides in part. "A local educational agency may
receive a basic grant or a special incentive grant under this subchapter for any fiscal
year only upon application therefor approved by the appropriate State educational agency,
upon its determination (consistent with such basic criteria as the Commissiner may estab-
lish) that, to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children
in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private element-
ary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special education-
al servces and arrangements in which such children can participate."
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4) discriminating against children in public schools by pro-
viding instruction in sectarian schools which is not avail-
able in public schools.
The plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that all these prac-
tices are in violation of the Constitution and law of the United
States and of the State of New York.
2
Flast parallels the Polier case but includes a parent of children
attending New York public schools among the group of plaintiffs.
This complaint, however, also challenges the expenditure of Federal
funds for religiously-affiliated schools under Title II of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act. Title II provides for the expenditure
of Federal funds to purchase textbooks and library materials for
use in private and public schools. Plaintiffs allege that providing
books and materials to religiously-affiliated schools violates the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 Comparable
relief to that asked for in Polier is sought in the federal court.
The basic constitutional questions are the same in both the
New York cases, but bringing suit in both federal and state courts
should increase the likelihood that the Supreme Court will accept
jurisdiction in at least one of the cases. Put another way, the
plaintiffs have two days in court.
Like the Horace Mann case, Polier and Flast present no guar-
antee of resolution to the constitutional issues involved. It now seems
apparent that if the plaintiffs' standing is challenged, the defendants
in all probability will be successful. Furthermore, even if the issue
of standing is not raised, at best it will be late in the October, 1968
term before either case reaches the Supreme Court. There does
remain some hope, however, that the Court will be receptive to the
interest sought to be protected by the parent in the Flast case.
CONCLUSION
The ever-increasing reliance of private institutions on Federal
funds, together with the uncertain legality of receiving those funds,
make judicial review legislation such as that offered in Senate Bill
3 imperative. While the Establishment Clause was originally
designed to limit Congress, today it is only enforceable against
State legislatures. It is indeed ironic that the same three colleges
which the Horace Mann decision ruled could not constitutionally
receive funds from the State of Maryland have each been recipients
of federal grants during the last two years. Senate Bill 3 contains
the necessary procedures to expeditiously resolve this paradox and
82. Poller, sitpra note 79, at 8-9. Defendants have not answered nor appeared in the
action.
83. Flast, supra note 9O, at 8.
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to answer many of the questions raised in this article. And, after
all, as Mr Justice Harlan said-
We have passed the point where litigation is regarded as
an evil that must be avoided if some accommodation short
of a lawsuit can possibly be worked out. Litigation is often
the desirable and orderly way of resolving disputes of broad
public significance, and of obtaining vindication of funda-
mental rights.8'
84. N.A.A.C.P v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
710
